Camp David Summit Peace talks collapse, whose fault was it?
They report that “an irate Clinton [told] Arafat: ‘If the Israelis can make compromises and you can’t, I should go home. You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything.'” Malley and Agha do not really attempt to deny Clinton’s charge; they merely explain the Palestinians’ behavior. They state that Arafat viewed Camp David as a trap, so that his “primary objective became to cut his losses rather than maximize his gains.” They even say of Arafat’s Palestinian negotiators that “most chose to go through the motions rather than go for a deal,” and that they “were unable to treat Camp David as a decisive, let alone a historic, gathering
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In regards to negotiations about Jerusalem.
At Taba, Israel pushed its Camp David approach of sweetening the offer to previously unimaginable extremes. Earlier, in November and December, Israel had completely dropped its refusal to divide Jerusalem. Israel was prepared, in Ben Ami’s words, to accept “full Palestinian sovereignty on Haram as-Sharif” with some recognition that the site was also “sacred to the Jews.”
Ben Ami explains that at Camp David, the Israeli side was looking for a solution for Jerusalem that would be “a division in practice…that didn’t look like a division.” Israel, in other words, was willing to give in on the substance but wanted to save face. The Palestinians, however, “weren’t ready for any face-saving formula for the Israelis. Not on the issue of the Temple Mount, not on sovereignty, not on anything.” These tactics led even Malley to tell Ben Ami at Camp David that the “Palestinians want to humiliate you.”8
According to Ross, Arafat was not only unable to rise above old mythologies but created new ones at Camp David. Ross reports that Arafat claimed that there “was no Temple in Jerusalem. It was only an obelisk.” Ross comments on Arafat’s historic creativity with diplomatic understatement: “When you question the core of the other side’s faith, that is not exactly an indication that you are getting ready to try and end the conflict.”9
The last “if only” that Malley, Agha, and Sontag postulate is what might have happened if the Taba talks had continued. These talks took place after the violent Palestinian rioting and attacks began, after Clinton had presented his “parameters” on December 23, 2000, and just before the Israeli elections and the end of Clinton’s presidency.
https://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp474.htm
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Arafat could not agree to giving up sovereignty of the Haram al-Sharif.
Does this indicate that the Palestinian and Arab side are uncompromising based on religious inflexibility?
The Palestinians demanded complete sovereignty over East Jerusalem and its holy sites, on the Temple Mount, and the dismantling of all Israeli neighborhoods built over the Green Line.
Israel proposed that the Palestinians be granted “custodianship,” though not sovereignty, on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif), with Israel retaining control over the Western Wall.
Israeli negotiators also proposed that the Palestinians be granted administration of, but not sovereignty over, the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City, with the Jewish and Armenian Quarters remaining in Israeli hands.
Palestinians would be granted administrative control over all Islamic and Christian holy sites, and would be allowed to raise the Palestinian flag over them. A passage linking northern Jerusalem to Islamic and Christian holy sites would be annexed by the Palestinian state.
Israel proposed that the Palestinians merge certain outer Arab villages and small cities that had been annexed to Jerusalem just after 1967 (such as Abu Dis, al-Eizariya, ‘Anata, A-Ram, and eastern Sawahre) to create the city of Al-Quds, which would serve as the capital of Palestine.
Was Israel’s offer not generous given the complexity of the situation?
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Here are the specifics of the Clinton compromise parameters:
C1. An independent, internationally recognized and sovereign Palestinian Arab state
C2. In a net 97% of the disputed territories
C3. Contiguous in Gaza and the “West Bank” (and with a connector between them)
C4. Including the Arab neighborhoods of “eastern” Jerusalem
C5. With the so-called “right of return” to the nascent state
C6. And a US$30 Billion fund to compensate and resettle the Arab refugees and their descendants.
